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Abstract
This paper studies optimal earnings taxation in a three period life-cycle
model where taxes can be differentiated according to age. Agents choose
their level of education when young and their retirement age when old.
I study the problem both without and with borrowing constraints. It is
shown that, without borrowing constraints, a first best optimum can be
decentralized by setting a zero tax rate in the third period and a first period
tax lower than the second period one. With borrowing constraints, the first
best can no longer be achieved. The gap between the first and second period
tax rates is larger, while the third period tax rate is generally different from
zero.
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1 Introduction
Should tax rates on labor earnings vary over the life-cycle? In reality, statu-
tory tax rates are usually independent of age. However, there are several
reasons why the effective tax rate on labor earnings is not constant over the
life-cycle. Apart from exemptions for young taxpayers, tax rates vary with
age due to the progressiveness of the tax system combined with the increas-
ing earning profile (see Gervais 2001). If the tax system is progressive, the
marginal tax rates that individuals face vary with earnings. Since earnings
vary over the lifetime of individuals, a progressive tax system implies that
the marginal tax rates faced by workers also vary with age. Another reason
comes from the tax/social security scheme targeted toward the old (see Gru-
ber and Wise 1999). Above a certain age, workers face a double loss when
deciding to continue their activity, namely the additional contribution and
the foregone benefit stemming from the social security scheme.
A natural question concerns the optimality of such a tax system. A first
rationale for age specific earning tax rates is related to the optimum tax
theory initiated by Mirrlees (1971) and the use of categorical transfers (see
Akerlof 1978, Immonen et al. 1998 and Viard 2001). When the government
cannot observe ability but can observe an exogenous characteristic which
is correlated with ability, it can improve the distributional effects of the
tax system using lump sum grants. But it can also improve the efficiency
of the tax system by conditioning the marginal income tax rates on the
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observable characteristic. This last criterion is analyzed in Kremer (1997) in
the context of age specific income taxation. He concludes that young workers
should optimally face lower marginal tax rates than older workers. Another
rationale concerns the optimal Ramsey taxation within a standard life-cycle
growth model in which agents’ tastes for consumption and leisure change
with age. This feature implies a non constant consumption-leisure choice for
the representative agent, even in a steady-state economy. In this context,
age specific income and consumption taxes are always optimal (Erosa and
Gervais 2002).1
The aim of the present paper is also to study Ramsey-optimal age-
dependent income tax rates. The analysis thus abstracts from any (intra-
cohort) redistributive aspects of the tax system. The originality of the anal-
ysis comes from the introduction of some important life-cycle decisions. In
Erosa and Gervais (2002), individuals’only choice variables are savings and
per period labor supply. The present study incorporates important life-cycle
decisions such as education and the retirement age. It also allows for incor-
poration of borrowing constraints. This gives rise to age-dependent tastes
for consumption and leisure that are explained by life-cycle decisions.
The framework is a simple representative agent model. The individual
lives for three periods of equal length. He chooses the amount of savings in
the first and second periods, and the fraction of time devoted to education in
1The tax rates paths depend on the earnings profile and preferences (see Erosa and
Gervais 2002).
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the first period. He chooses when to retire during the third period, whereas
he inelastically supplies one unit of labor in the second period. Consequently,
this model assumes an endogenous extensive labor supply (i.e. the duration
of a career) but a non-elastic intensive labor supply (i.e. weekly or yearly
labor supply). The government chooses the age-specific flat income tax rates
so as to finance an exogenous amount of public expenditure by maximizing
the life-cycle utility of the representative agent.
The approach allows one to address different efficiency issues that are
often discussed in the literature. Two important efficiency issues that arise in
life-cycle models are related to the decisions to enter and to leave the labor
market. When education is taken into account, the decision to enter the
labor market is subject to an opportunity cost, namely the trade-off between
higher future income due to the returns of education and the loss of income
due to the postponement of entering the labor market. Additionaly, above
a certain age, the individual faces a double loss when working an additional
year, namely income taxes and foregone retirement benefits. This double
taxation creates an implicit tax on continued activity which is negatively
correlated with the labor force participation of the elderly (see Gruber and
Wise 1999). This positive result is often used to advocate reforms tending to
remove the bias in the benefit formulas. This raises the question of whether a
bias in the benefit formula in favor of early retirement is necessarily the sign
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of a bad policy.2 Another issue is the existence of borrowing constraints.
If the capital market is imperfect, there may exist borrowing constraints
especially when workers are young, and the tax system is likely to affect
the strength of this constraint, which will in turn affect the individual’s
decisions. An age-specific tax rate could at least partially eliminate this
imperfection by imposing some transfers between generations.
I start with the benchmark case of no borrowing constraints and show
that the availability of age-dependent income tax rates leads to a first best
outcome. The first period tax rate should be positive but lower than the
second period one. The third period tax rate should be zero, which is
compatible with a marginally fair social security system. With borrowing
constraints, the gap between the first and the second period tax rates is
higher and the third period tax is different from 0. This last property comes
from the introduction of both endogenous retirement age and education. If
these two variables are positively related, then the third period tax should
be negative. Otherwise, it should be positive.
2 The model
The model is a simple partial equilibrium, three period life-cycle model.
I Assume zero interest and discount rates and a zero population growth
2See Cremer et al. (2004) who deal with this issue in an optimal redistributive income
taxation framework.
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rate.3 In period 1, the individual supplies a fraction 1− e units of labor and
spends a fraction e in education while saving s1. In period 2, he inelastically
supplies one unit of labor and saves s2. In the third period, the individual
chooses his retirement date l, i.e, the fraction of this period during which he
remains at work. His consumption is financed by his earnings and the return
from his savings. The real wage w is an increasing and concave function of
education:
w = w(e), w0(e) > 0, w00(e) < 0.
Letting ci denote period i consumption, the life-cycle utility function U(c1, c2, c3, l)
is assumed to be separable between periods and between consumption and
leisure:
U(c1, c2, c3, l) = u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3) + v(1− l),
where u(.) and v(.) satisfy the usual properties: u0(.), v0(.) > 0, u00(.), v00(.) <
0where u0(.) and u00.) denote the first and second derivatives of u(.) respectively.
The same holds for v0(.) and v00(.). Finally, σ(ci) denotes the elasticity of the
marginal utility that is, σ(ci) = −ciu00(ci)/u0(ci), which is also the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
3 Implicitely, we assume a stationnary equilibrium within an overlapping generation
model. With this assumption, taxing an individual over his life cycle or taxing a society
at a given point in time are identical problems.
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This model implies that labor is endogenous in the first and the third
period. The assumption of inelastic labor in period 2 may seem somewhat
restrictive, but labor elasticity should be thought of in terms of “time spent
in the labor force” rather than “work hours per week” supplied. I come back
to this in the conclusion.
The following section studies the individual’s problem for given levels
of tax rates. Section 3.1 starts by studying the problem without liquidity
constraint and identifies the conditions under which the individual chooses
a positive amount of savings in the first period. Section 3.2 presents the
constrained problem and some resulting comparative statics which are use-
ful for the rest of the analysis. Section 4 presents the problem facing the
government.
3 The problem of the individual
The individual determines the level of education e, first and second period
savings, s1 and s2, and the retirement age, l, maximizing his life-cycle util-
ity under the constraint that first period savings must be non negative. I
assume throughout the paper that s2 is always positive, i.e that the second
period borrowing constraint is not binding. Letting ti denote the period
i proportional income tax rate, the problem facing the individual can be
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written as follows:
Max
e,l,s1,s2
u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3) + v(1− l),
s.to: c1 = (1− e)(1− t1)w(e)− s1,
c2 = (1− t2)w(e)− s2 + s1,
c3 = l(1− t3)w(e) + s2,
s1 ≥ 0.
Letting µ denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the borrowing
constraint on s1, the first order conditions with respect to e, l, s1 and s2 for
an interior solution are:
[w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)](1− t1)u
0
(c1) +
w0(e)(1− t2)u
0
(c2) + w
0(e)l(1− t3)u
0
(c3) = 0, (1)
w(e)(1− t3)u
0
(c3)− v
0
(1− l) = 0, (2)
u0(c2)− u
0
(c1) + µ = 0, (3)
u
0
(c2)− u
0
(c3) = 0, (4)
µ ≥ 0.
Equation (1) states that the marginal utility loss due to the foregone income
in the first period must equal the marginal utility gain from the higher
wage in the future. Equation (2) implies the usual equality between the
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marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and net labor
productivity. Because s2 is assumed to be positive, the individual always
sets c2 = c3.
3.1 The unconstrained problem
Let me first consider the case µ = 0 in the individual’s problem, that is,
either the capital market is perfect, or the individual chooses a non negative
s1. I first present the first-order conditions determining the optimal choices
of e and l and then infer the conditions for which these choices lead to non
negative savings in the first period. From (1) to (2), the optimal choices of
e and l are given by the two following equations:
w0(e) [2− e+ l]−w(e)
= t1
£
(1− e)w0(e)− w(e)
¤
+ w0(e) [t2 + lt3] , (5)
w(e)(1− t3)u
0
(c)− v0(1− l) = 0, (6)
where c = ci ≡ 1/3[lw(e)(1− t3)+w(e)(1− t2)+ (1− e)w(e)(1− t1)]. Given
that interest and discount rates are zero, the individual chooses to equate
consumption ci = c across the three periods. (5) states that the individual
chooses the amount of education that maximizes his life-cycle income.
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It is easy to show that the optimal first period savings are given by:
s1 =
2
3
(1− e)(1− t1)w(e)−
1
3
(1− t2)w(e)−
1
3
lw(e)(1− t3).
Using the first order condition (5) , this can be rewritten as:
s1 =
w(e)(1− t1)
3w0(e)
£
3w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)
¤
.
Defining ec as the level of education such that 3w0(ec)(1− ec)− w(ec) = 0,
s1 is negative if e > ec. When the individual chooses e > ec, the first period
income is lower than future income since labor supply is small relative to
that in the second and third period. This makes the individual borrow from
future period income.
3.2 The constrained problem
Assume now that e > ec in the unconstrained problem. The first order
condition for e becomes:
Ue = (1− t1)[w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)]u
0
(c1) +
w0(e) [(1− t2) + l(1− t3)]u
0
(c) = 0, (7)
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with
c1 = (1− e)w(e)(1− t1),
c = c2 = c3 =
1
2
w(e) [(1− t2) + l(1− t3)] ,
where Ue denotes the first-order derivative of life-cycle utility U with respect
to e. Note that since the constraint s1 > 0 is binding, c1 < c. The main dif-
ference of this setup is that the individual is not able to smooth consumption
between the first period and the later ones. The system formed by (7) and
(6) defines the individual decision variables as a function of the tax rates:
e = e∗ (t1, t2, t3) and l = l∗ (t1, t2, t3).
Define the optimal level of education given in (7) as a function of the
t0is ,and for a given retirement age l : e (t1, t2, t3, l) . In the government’s
problem, the following comparative statics will be useful:
de
dl
= −w
0(e)(1− t3)u0(c)(1− σ(c))
Uee
R 0 if σ(c) Q 1,
de
dt1
=
[w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)] [1− σ (c1)]u
0
(c1)
Uee
R 0 if σ(c1) Q 1,
de
dt2
=
w0(e)u0(c) [1− σ(c)]
Uee
R 0 if σ(c) R 1,
where Uee is strictly negative.
The sign of these expressions depends upon σ(c) or σ(c1). To understand
this, observe in equation (7) that increasing l has a positive substitution
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effect on e since it increases the marginal gain of income in period 3 by
w0(e)(1−t3). It also has a negative income effect since it increases disposable
income in period 3 by w(e)(1 − t3). Recall that σ(c) is a measure of the
utility cost of variability in consumption. When σ(c) > 1, the income effect
dominates since this utility cost is relatively high so that e reacts negatively
to an increase in l. Otherwise, the substitution effect dominates and e reacts
positively to an increase in l.
Similarly increasing t1 decreases the marginal loss of income in period
1 by −(w0(e)(1 − e) − w(e)). It also has a negative income effect since it
decreases period 1 disposable income by w(e)(1 − e). The positive (resp.
negative) effect dominates if σ(c1) is lower (resp. higher) than 1. The effect
of t2 on e also includes a substitution and an income effect whose signs are,
however, opposite to those of the effects of a rise in t1. An increase in t2 has
a negative substitution effect since it decreases the marginal gain of income
in period 2 by w0(e). It has also a positive income effect since it decreases
period 2 disposable income by w(e). Again, the income effect will dominate
if σ(c) > 1.
4 The problem of the government
The government needs to finance an exogenous per capita amount of public
expenditure R0 with flat-rate income taxes and maximizes the represen-
tative individual’s indirect utility function. The budget constraint of the
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government is:
R0 ≡ Rc = w(e) [(1− e)t1 + t2 + lt3] , (8)
where Rc defines the total tax revenue. Letting W (t1, t2, t3) denote the
indirect utility function of the individual, the government solves:
Max
t1,t2,t3
W (t1, t2, t3) + λ [R
c −R0] .
In a first part, I describe the solution of the government’s problem when
the individual is not constrained. I turn to the constrained problem of the
government in section 4.2.
4.1 The non constrained problem of the government
When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the availability of age-specific
tax rates allows the government to implement the first best allocation. To see
this, note that such an allocation can be decentralized by setting (t1, t2, t3)
such that:
w0(e) [t1(1− e) + t2 + lt3]− w(e)t1 = 0, (9)
t3 = 0, (10)
Rc = R0.
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where e ≤ ec, so that the individual is not constrained. As can be inferred by
(5), equation (9) is the condition for education to be not distorted. Clearly,
the decision to invest in education is not distorted as long as the tax bill
on additional earnings associated with education (first term) is equal to the
subsidies to this investment (second term).
Note also for future reference that (9) and (10) imply that the individ-
ual’s decision variables have no marginal effect on tax revenues, that is
∂Rc
∂e
= w0(e) [t1(1− e) + t2 + lt3]− w(e)t1 = 0, (11)
∂Rc
∂l
= w (e) t3 = 0. (12)
Combining equation (9) and the fact that the first best education is described
by w0(e) [2 + l − e] = w(e), it is straightforward to show that:
t1(1 + l) = t2 + lt3.
This equation means that the first period tax must be equal to the average
income tax in the second and the third period. A uniform proportional
tax fulfills this condition but since the third period income should not be
taxed, the tax rates will be differentiated according to the periods. Using
the budget constraint of the government (8), one is now able to characterize
the optimum:
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Proposition 1 When there is no (binding) borrowing constraint, the use of
age dependent income tax rates leads to a first best optimum with:
t1 =
R0
w(e)(2 + l − e) =
t2
(1 + l)
,
t3 = 0.
where e ≤ ec.
The first period tax is then the ratio of the per capita public expenditure
to the gross working-life wage income. The second period tax will never be
lower than the first period tax. The special case of a uniform taxation
between the first and the second period arises when the fraction of time
devoted to work in the third period is 0. The fact that the first period tax
is lower than the second one comes from the introduction of an endogenous
retirement age. Because it is optimal not to tax the third period income
since it would distort the choice of l, income that is not taxed in this period
will be taxed in the second period in order not to distort education.
4.2 The constrained problem of the government
Assume from now on that e > ec, where e is the optimal level of education
chosen by the individual as a function of the tax rates given in proposition
1. These tax rates imply that the individual is constrained so that they are
not optimal. In the appendix, it is shown that the constrained optimum
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yields the two following equations:
w(e)(1− e)
µ
u0(c1)
u0(c)
− 1
¶
= −min
∙
0,
∂Rc
∂e
µ
(1− e)u0(c1)
u0(c)
de
dt2
− de
dt1
¶¸
,(13)
∂Rc
∂e
de
dl
+
∂Rc
∂l
= 0, (14)
where ∂Rc/∂e > 0 and ∂Rc/∂l are given respectively by equations (11) and
(12).
To understand the intuition behind equation (13), assume one starts
from the optimal tax rates as given in proposition 1, where ∂Rc/∂e = 0 as
shown in (11). From this point, an increase in t2 combined with a welfare
balanced decrease in t1 increases tax revenue by the LHS of (13). In other
words, reducing the gap between c1 and c by a decrease of t1 compensated
by an increase in t2 increases tax revenues. Not surprisingly, this implies
that the gap between the first and the second period tax rates is larger with
borrowing constraints. The LHS is thus the direct tax revenue gain from an
increase in t2 combined with a welfare balanced decrease of t1.
The second term in brackets of the RHS of (13) represents the tax rev-
enue variation induced by the same (compensated) change via the effect
on education. If this change represents a loss of resources (in which case
this term is negative), one has a simple trade-off between this loss and the
marginal gain represented by the LHS. Otherwise, if this change represents
a gain (in which case the term is positive), it is always optimal to increase t2
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and decrease t1 until the intertemporal equality of consumptions is restored.
Therefore, a necessary condition for having c1 = c at the optimum is
that the second term in the RHS of (13) is positive. This inequality would
imply that an increase in t2 combined with a welfare balanced decrease of
t1 has a positive effect on tax revenue via the effect on education. Since
optimality necessarily requires that ∂Rc/∂e > 0,4 this regime occurs if a
decrease in t1 combined with a welfare balanced increase in t2 has a positive
effect on the level of education:
Proposition 2 With borrowing constraints, the optimum involves c1 = c if
and only if:
(1− e) de
dt2
− u
0(c)
u0(c1)
de
dt1
≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
w0(e)(1− e) (1− σ(c))−
¡
w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)
¢
(1− σ(c1)) ≥ 0. (15)
Before going further, consider the simple case where the utility function
is CES. In this case, σ(ci) = σ so that inequality (15) is equivalent to
σ < 1. In this case, increasing t2 and decreasing t1 decrease the level of
education, which in turn decrease tax revenues. Consequently, there is a
4Assume instead that ∂Rc/∂e < 0 with c1 < c. Then a marginal decrease in e would
create a budget surplus and relax the borrowing constraint. This contradicts the fact that
it is an optimum.
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tradeoff between reducing the gap between c1 and c (which increases tax
revenue) and the tax revenue loss implied by the decrease in the level of
education. However, if σ ≥ 1, reducing the gap between c1 and c by means
of a compensated change in t1 and t2 does not decrease the level of education,
which in turn does not decrease tax revenues. In this case, intertemporal
equality of consumption occurs at the optimum.
In the more general case of a non CES utility function, one can make
the same reasoning when both σ(c1) and σ(c) are lower (or higher) than 1.
When σ(c1) > 1 and σ(c) < 1,5 matters get more complicated since a rise
in t2 has a negative effect on education (the substitution effect dominates)
and a decrease in t1 has a positive effect on education (the income effect
dominates). The total effect of a welfare balanced change of t1 and t2 on
education then depends upon the difference between σ(c1) and σ(c) but also
upon the relative returns to education in period 1: if the relative returns to
education in period 1 as measured by [(w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)) /w0(e)(1− e)]
are high in absolute value (i.e. an increase in education implies a high loss
in period 1 income), the positive income effect on education due to the
decrease in t1 may dominate the negative substitution effect of t2. In this
case, reducing the gap between c1 and c increases the level of education and
condition (15) is fulfilled. A symmetric argument applies to the case where
σ(c1) < 1 and σ(c) > 1.
5Note that a necessary condition for this is that the elasticity of marginal utility is a
decreasing function of consumption.
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Equation (14) states that the retirement age has no marginal effect on
tax revenue, taking into account its indirect effect on education. Since t3
is the only tax with a distortive effect on l (t1 and t2 only have an income
effect), the optimum involves the compensated effect of t3 on l having no
(marginal) effect on tax revenues. Remember that this inequality is fulfilled
in the first best optimum since ∂Rc/∂e = ∂Rc/∂l = 0, as shown in (11)
and (12). Now, these equalities are not sustainable since the individual is
constrained.
It turns out that the third-period tax is generally different from zero.
To see this, suppose one starts from a zero third-period tax rate. In this
case, one has ∂Rc/∂l = w (e) t3 = 0. Increasing t3 thus makes tax revenues
increase if (∂Rc/∂e) (−de/dl) > 0, that is, if the decrease in the compensated
retirement age makes education vary such that the tax revenues increase.
Since one has ∂Rc/∂e > 0, an increase in t3 has a positive impact on tax
revenues if de/dl < 0, that is, if education and retirement are negatively
related. In the opposite case where education and the retirement age are
positively related, it is optimal to decrease t3 below zero.
The sign of t3 then depends upon the sign of de/dl. Using the compar-
ative statics, one has:
Proposition 3 With borrowing constraints, the optimum leads to sign (t3) =
sign [σ(c)− 1] .
When σ(c) = 1, e does not directly depends upon l. In this case, there
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is no reason to deviate from a zero third period tax rate. When σ(c) < 1,
consumptions are relatively high substitutes so that e and l are positively
correlated. This means that a compensated decrease in l (due to an increase
in t3) indirectly decreases education and hence tax revenues. Starting from a
zero third period tax rate, it is thus optimal to subsidize labor by decreasing
the third period tax. This increases the compensated retirement age so that
education increases ,which in turn increase tax revenues. However, when
σ(c) > 1, an increase in t3 reduces the compensated retirement age and
positively affects the level of education which in turn increases tax revenues.
In this case, a positive third period tax rate is desirable.
To sum up, the constrained optimum still leads to a first period tax that
is lower than the second period one. The gap between these two tax rates
is larger than without borrowing constraints. The third period tax is no
longer equal to 0. This tax rate may be positive or negative following the
negative or positive relation between education and the retirement age.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have considered a Ramsey tax problem in which it is possible
to differentiate the flat earnings tax rates according to age. A three period
model is built in which education when young and retirement when old are
endogenous. Without borrowing constraints when young, the optimal tax
rates involve a lower tax for the young than for the middle aged workers.
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Labor earnings when old are not taxed. With borrowing constraints, the gap
between the tax rate for the young and the middle aged workers is higher.
Depending upon the values of the elasticities of marginal utilities and the
relative return of education, it may be optimal to restore intertemporal
equality of consumptions. The labor tax rate on the old may be either
positive or negative depending upon the relation between retirement age and
education. If both are positively related (which is the case if the elasticity
of marginal utility is lower than one), the tax rate is negative. In the reverse
case where they are negatively correlated (which is the case if the elasticity
of marginal utility is higher than one), the tax rate is positive.
In order to tackle the problem without too many difficulties, the model
used some simplifying assumptions. An important one is that of exogenous
intensive labor supply. Relaxing this assumption would imply that a first
best outcome would not be attainable with the age dependent tax rates.
However, the qualitative properties of the model would remain unchanged.
Since intensive labor supply would be endogenous in each period, each age-
dependent tax rates would have an equivalent effect on each (per period)
intensive labor supply. Therefore, the problem would just be rescaled. An-
other assumption is the one of separable utility functions. If the utility
functions are not separable over time, the individual would choose to equal-
ize marginal utilities of consumptions instead of equalizing consumptions.
This would complicate the analysis without changing the main mechanisms
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of the model. In particular, the first best outcome would remain unchanged.
With borrowing constraints, the important issue would remain the elasticity
of substitution between consumptions.
This model could be extended in many ways. First, tax instruments
are limited to wage tax rates. Extending the present analysis in a general
equilibrium Ramsey problem with consumption taxes is on the research
agenda. One may also introduce education expenses instead of treating the
education decision as a mere trade off between foregone time and higher
future earnings. Finally, the model could be extended to the case where one
allows redistribution between agents of the same cohort. The tax rate on
old individuals’labor earnings would of course be different from zero given
the desirability to redistribute income within generations.
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Appendix
A Comparative statics
In this particular problem, the individual chooses two variables. In analyzing
the effect of ti on these two decision variables, it is useful for the following
to distinguish their direct effects from the indirect effect via the change in
the other decision variable. Formally, e∗ (t1, t2, t3) and l∗ (t1, t2, t3) are given
by the system (7) and (6) . Define e (t1, t2, t3, l) and l (t1, t2, t3, e) as the
level of education and the retirement age (for a given level of retirement age
and education respectively) as given implicitly by (7) and (6). de∗/dti and
dl∗/dti can be decomposed as follows:
de∗
dti
= C
∙
de
dti
+
de
dl
dl
dti
¸
,
dl∗
dti
= C
∙
dl
dti
+
dl
de
de
dti
¸
,
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where C > 06 and de/dti and dl/dti are direct uncorrected effects of ti on e
and l and obtained respectively by differentiation of (7) and (6). This gives:
de
dt1
=
[w0(e)(1− e)− w(e)] [1− σ (c1)]u
0
(c1)
Uee
R 0 if σ(c1) Q 1,
dl
dt1
= 0,
de
dt2
=
w0(e)u0(c) [1− σ(c)]
Uee
R 0 if σ(c) R 1,
dl
dt2
=
h
1
2 (w(e))
2 (1− t3)u
00
(c)
i
Ull
> 0,
de
dt3
= l
de
dt2
,
dl
dt3
=
dl
dt2
+
del
dt3
,
where Ull < 0 is the second order derivative of the LHS of (6) with respect
to l. del/dt3 = w(e)u0(c)/Ull < 0 is the compensated effect of t3 on l.
6The corrective term C =
h
1− de
dl
0 dl
de
0i−1
=
[UeeUll−U2el]
UeeUll
is greater than zero given that
the second order conditions of the individuals problem holds.
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B Derivation of expressions (14) and (13)
The government program leads to first order conditions with respect to t1
t2 and t3 given by:
− (1− e)w(e)u0(c1) + λ
∙
w(e)(1− e) + ∂R
c
∂e
de∗
dt1
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt1
¸
= 0,
− w(e)u0(c) + λ
∙
w(e) +
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt2
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt2
¸
= 0,
− lw(e)u0(c) + λ
∙
lw(e) +
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt3
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt3
¸
= 0,
where ∂Rc/∂e and ∂Rc/∂l are given by the left hand sides of (11) and (12).
Combining first order conditions with respect to t2 and t3, one obtains:
∂Rc
∂e
µ
l
de∗
dt2
− de
∗
dt3
¶
+
∂Rc
∂l
µ
l
dl∗
dt2
− dl
∗
dt3
¶
= 0.
Decomposing direct and indirect effects, one has:
∂Rc
∂e
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
l dedt2 −
de
dt3
+dedl
³
l dldt2 −
dl
dt3
´
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+
∂Rc
∂l
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
l dldt2 −
dl
dt3
+ dlde
³
l dedt2 −
de
dt3
´
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = 0. (A1)
By the comparative statics, one has:
l
de
dt2
=
de
dt3
,
and l
dl
dt2
− dl
dt3
= − d
el
dt3
.
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Thus, (A1) simplifies to:
∂Rc
∂e
µ
de
dl
¶
δel
δt3
+
∂Rc
∂l
del
dt3
= 0.
Factorizing by d
el
dt3
leads to equation (14). Similarly, combining the optimal-
ity conditions of t1 and t2, one has:
u0(c1)(1− e)
u0(c)
µ
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt2
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt2
+ w(e)
¶
−
µ
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt1
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt1
+ (1− e)w(e)
¶
= 0.
Next, decompose the effect of the taxes on tax revenue via the decision
variables. One has:
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dti
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dti
= C
∂Rc
∂e
µ
de
dti
+
de
dl
dl
dti
¶
+C
∂Rc
∂l
µ
dl
dti
+
dl
de
de
dti
¶
= C
de
dti
µ
∂Rc
∂e
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl
de
¶
+ C
dl
dti
µ
∂Rc
∂e
de
dl
+
∂Rc
∂l
¶
= C
de
dti
µ
∂Rc
∂e
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl
de
¶
,
where (14) was used . Again using (14) for the expression in brackets, one
can rewrite:
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dti
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dti
= C
de
dti
∂Rc
∂e
µ
1− de
dl
dl
de
¶
.
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Given that C = 1
1− de
dl
dl
de
, one finally obtains:
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dti
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dti
=
∂Rc
∂e
de
dti
. (A2)
Substituting (A2) in:
u0(c1)(1− e)
u0(c)
µ
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt2
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt2
+ w(e)
¶
−
µ
∂Rc
∂e
de∗
dt1
+
∂Rc
∂l
dl∗
dt1
+ (1− e)w(e)
¶
= 0.
gives equation (13) , provided that c1 ≤ c.
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